How do you assess the individual risks in enterprise risk management, that is, in company-wide risk management? And how do you combine them into an overall picture? These questions were the subject of a two-part talk on risk quantification that we gave to a working group of the Risk Management & Rating Association.
The first part shows in Excel how to assess risks with distributions and aggregate them with a Monte Carlo simulation. It also shows how to assess an individual risk with a model built from its drivers. The second part shows what needs to be considered when designing the entire risk management process: who estimates the risks, how non-financial impacts are included, how to handle several years and the current financial year, and how long the risk capital lasts.
What information does a risk assessment need?
In short: Risk Kit is an add-in for Microsoft Excel that lets you build and analyse Monte Carlo simulations directly in the spreadsheet. What we show here applies in general, though: assessing and aggregating risks with a Monte Carlo simulation works on the same principle in any simulation tool.
The first example is a risk aggregation as required by IDW PS 340. The template for it is included in Risk Kit. In it, each risk is assessed twice, before measures and after measures, that is, gross and net. Figure 1 shows the block before measures. Each row describes one risk.
Figure 1: The template for the risk aggregation with the block before measures. All ten example risks are assessed with the PERT distribution using the minimum, the most likely and the maximum loss (German interface).
For each risk, we first record the usual data: the risk ID, the name of the risk in plain text and the risk field, for example market risk, climate risk or cyber risk. The risk field is an intermediate aggregate between the individual risk and the company as a whole. This later shows whether the company takes large risks in areas that do not fit its business model and are therefore undesirable.
The assessment starts with the question of whether a risk can occur only once or several times per period. Most risks can occur several times, but some are so singular that they can occur only once. This property applies regardless of the measures taken. The template therefore records it only in the block before measures, in the column “Risiko kann mehrfach auftreten” (risk can occur several times).
For the occurrence of a risk there is a probability or a frequency of occurrence. For the impact on occurrence, we use a distribution with certain parameters. The distribution is named clearly so that it is obvious what exactly is being assessed. A simple way to start is to assess all risks with a three-point distribution. We chose the PERT distribution, which represents the minimum, the most likely and the maximum loss. For the recession, risk 1, these are €0, €1,750,000 and €5,000,000 with a probability of occurrence of 0.25. These parameters are easy to understand and to explain, and the assessment remains consistent.
Which distributions fit?
In football, we know that you can play the ball in many ways: dribble, pass, stop, volley, curl, head and so on. Even as fourteen-year-olds we wanted to react flexibly to the situation in a match and play the ball accordingly. A player who can only play with his right foot and only shoot curled balls would be a risk to his team. If all players do the same thing, the team may be entertaining, but it will not be successful. It is the same in risk management. The point is to choose the right and useful methods. We do not want to do everything, but what matters.
Risk Kit offers a manageable selection of the most important distributions for modelling in companies. There are many more, but most of us will hardly ever need distributions such as Bradford or Burr, unless we are actuaries at an insurance company. The selection consists of three groups:
- For the occurrence of a risk there are distributions such as Bernoulli, binomial, multinomial and Poisson.
- For the impacts we use classic distributions such as PERT, triangular, modified PERT, LogNormal or Weibull.
- In addition, there are innovative distributions such as Expert, Flex and Poly.
If we use several distributions, we always state the name of the distribution and the matching parameters. Figure 2 shows this for the assessment after measures. The column “Verteilung” (distribution) here contains Normal, Pert, LogNormal3, Pert2P, Trapezoid, Weibull, Expert, Dreieck (triangular), Flex and ModPert. The columns “Param 1” to “Param 6” hold a different number of parameters depending on the distribution.
Figure 2: The block after measures of the same template. Each risk is assessed with its own distribution, whose name is in the column “Verteilung” (distribution) and whose parameters follow in the columns “Param 1” to “Param 6” (German interface).
Good case and bad case instead of worst case
We made sure to provide distributions that experts can estimate well. That is better than the worst case, which is often deceptive. Nobody wants to claim that every risk has a maximum and that this maximum is known exactly.
Proven methods can also be used in a new way. For the PERT distribution, for example, we make it possible to enter a good case and a bad case instead of a best case and a worst case. Experts find these easier to estimate. Here the good case is the 10% quantile and the bad case the 90% quantile, that is, a value that is exceeded in only 10% of cases. Risk Kit then extends these points to a PERT distribution.
Figure 3 shows this for the flooding of the production site, which is assessed after measures with Pert2P in Figure 2. The entries are the good case of €1,250,000 as the 10% quantile, the most likely value of €1,800,000 and the bad case of €2,750,000 as the 90% quantile. The two blue lines in the chart mark the two quantiles. The minimum and maximum follow from the extension: according to the statistics on the right, the smallest value is around €783,000 and the largest around €3.84 million. The expert does not have to state them.
Figure 3: The PERT distribution for the flooding after measures, defined by the good case (10% quantile), the most likely value and the bad case (90% quantile). The blue lines mark the two quantiles, and the statistics on the right show the minimum and maximum of the extended distribution (German interface).
The distributions shown can also be fitted to data and to simulation results. Poly and Flex in particular are so flexible that they even cover the other continuous distributions as special cases. In this way, a few distributions open up many possibilities, like a Swiss army knife.
How do you aggregate the risks and check the risk-bearing capacity?
For the aggregation, we add up the simulated losses of all risks and obtain the total loss before measures and the total loss after measures. In the example, Risk Kit runs 10,000 simulation runs for this. The results can be saved and archived. For review, they can be passed on to auditors or colleagues without handing over the model with all its formulas.
A results report shows the gross and net results side by side as a histogram and as a distribution function. This is the view from above on the company’s risk, so to speak. Figure 4 shows the distribution functions. They give the probability that the total loss does not exceed a given amount. The orange curve after measures rises much earlier than the blue one before measures. At €5,000,000 it is already close to 1, the blue one only at about 0.3. So after measures a total loss of at most €5,000,000 is almost certain, before measures only in about 30% of cases.
Figure 4: The distribution functions of the total loss before measures (blue) and after measures (orange) from the results report (German interface).
In the report, the sensitivities show in a drill-down how strongly the aggregated risk fluctuates when an individual risk occurs. Risk maps are often criticised. In Risk Kit they are shown as a general scatter plot that plots two dimensions of a risk against each other, for example the frequency of occurrence and the contribution to the 99% value at risk. A categorical risk map plots the reputational damage against the financial loss.
Below this, the report contains a table with the overall risk figures before and after measures and with a risk tolerance curve, shown in Figure 5. With it, we can assess the risk-bearing capacity in escalation levels and see whether the risk is smaller than the available capital.
Figure 5: Risk aggregates, risk-bearing capacity and rating in the results report. On the right the required risk coverage potential for different target PDs and the base data of the rating procedure (German interface).
The block “Risikoaggregate” (risk aggregates) contains the expected loss and the value at risk (VaR) of the total loss at different confidence levels. The 99.9% VaR is the loss that is not exceeded in 99.9% of the simulation runs. The measures reduce the expected loss from €6,846,905 to €2,493,313 and the 99.9% VaR from €17,990,681 to €10,934,422.
In the block “Risikotragfähigkeit” (risk-bearing capacity), each confidence level is matched by its own risk capital, from €3,000,000 for the expected loss to €13,000,000 for the 99.9% VaR. These levels form the risk tolerance curve. The column “Verwendetes Kapital” (capital used) shows how much of it the total loss after measures takes up. At the 50% VaR, it is €2,115,166 of €4,000,000, that is, 53%. The share is highest at the 99.9% VaR with 84%. At all levels, the risk after measures therefore stays below the risk capital.
More on this: Our case study “How does risk aggregation work under IDW PS 340 and StaRUG?” shows how to aggregate risks with this template and compare them with the risk-bearing capacity.
How the risks change the rating
Risk Kit contains ready-made rating procedures of the Deutsche Bundesbank, the Oesterreichische Nationalbank and a number of authors. The procedure in Figure 5 was developed by Marco Wolfrum and Werner Gleißner to calculate the effect of the value at risk on the rating. Here the rating is expressed as a probability of default (PD). On the right are the company’s base data: equity of €50,000,000, capital employed of €210,000,000, EBT of €35,000,000 and provisions of €3,000,000. The PD today is 0.77%. The columns “PD vor Maßnahmen” and “PD nach Maßnahmen” (PD before and after measures) show how the PD changes with the respective loss. At the 99.9% VaR it rises to 1.93% before and 1.36% after measures.
A rating procedure can also be used the other way round. You set a target PD and derive the required risk capital from it. In the block “Notwendiges Risikodeckungspotential” (required risk coverage potential), for example, a target PD of 0.90% goes with required risk capital of €2,900,000 and a target PD of 1.50% with €12,900,000. All these calculations, however, assume that the rating procedure is representative of your own company and therefore suitable.
How do you assess a risk with a model?
Until now, risk assessment has mostly been based on expert judgement. This is a major obstacle to effective risk management and one reason why many boards do not take the topic seriously enough. We therefore need a new approach: assessing risks with the help of models.
One example is cyber risk, which the working group had discussed before. IT departments have a great many cyber risks because they have to cover many systems and different threat scenarios. There are often ten times as many cyber risks as general corporate risks. It is therefore important to bundle these risks and deliver only a few clusters to enterprise risk management.
Cyber risk is a case-based risk. Such risks also exist in other areas. A hospital performs many operations, and some go wrong. A manufacturer sells products, and some are defective. An IT department is attacked, and some attacks succeed.
Breaking the risk down into its drivers
In risk aggregation we combine risks. To assess an individual risk, we go the opposite way and break it down into its drivers. What drives the risk, and how does the mechanism work by which it is triggered and by which its impacts arise?
For cyber risk, we first look at the frequency of attacks. For a particular type of attack there is then a certain vulnerability: most attacks are fended off, and only a few succeed. Successful attacks cause direct costs, for example because the server environment has to be set up again. Some successful attacks also cause secondary losses, for example through the theft and leaking of confidential data. This can lead to reputational damage, lawsuits, ransom payments and so on. IT routinely carries out business impact analyses for this. You could continue the list and also look at tertiary losses. The approach remains the same.
A distribution that is open to the right for the attack frequency
In the next step, we describe the drivers as distributions. The very first one, the attack frequency, is a challenge. Can we say exactly how often we will be attacked at most? Usually not. IT departments do collect a lot of data, but it has to be qualified, because not every attack is recorded and the threat situation can change quickly. So we need a distribution that is open to the right, integrates data and can be adjusted by expert judgement.
The Expert distribution is ideal for this. It uses three quantiles: the good case, the median and the bad case. Optionally we specify a minimum, while the maximum remains open. What counts as a good and a bad case is set by a probability. Here the good case is a 5% case and the bad case a 95% case.
Figure 6 shows the model with the Expert distribution for the attack frequency. In the table “Eingaben” (inputs), it has the minimum 0, the good case 100, the median 300 and the bad case 1,000 attacks. The statistics on the right show these values as the 5% quantile, median and 95% quantile. With 99.9% probability we are at no more than about 5,000 attacks, 5,122 to be exact. The preview chart shows the distribution down to one case in a million, and its axis extends to 90,000 attacks. So the distribution has a thin, long tail that also covers extreme values. That would not be possible with a PERT distribution. It is always short and stout, so to speak, and could never have such a long tail.
Figure 6: The cyber risk model with the inputs on the left and the Expert distribution for the attack frequency on the right. The distribution has a minimum of 0 and is open to the right; its maximum is infinite (German interface).
Each attack now becomes a coin toss. The successful attacks are the coin tosses in which the coin came up heads, in Figure 6 with a vulnerability of 0.075%. Whether a successful attack leads to a secondary loss is again a coin toss, one per successful attack, here with a probability of 10%. The direct and secondary losses are then the sum of the impacts of the respective successful attacks. Their size is also described in the table with a minimum, a good case, a median and a bad case.
More on this: Our case study “How do you assess cyber risks with a Monte Carlo simulation?” shows how to assess the factors of a cyber risk one by one and combine many cyber risks into a cluster.
What the simulation shows
We run the simulation and obtain the probability of occurrence and the quantiles. Nothing happens in about 76% of cases. Sometimes only smaller, primary losses occur, in rarer cases a first secondary loss and in very rare cases several secondary losses.
We then combine a portfolio of 30 cyber risks. Its distribution has a special shape with several humps that stand for one, two or more secondary losses. In the portfolio, the probability of occurrence is almost 100%, because with so many risks something always happens.
To possibly transfer losses to an external party, we also assess a cyber risk insurance policy. The expected loss is split exactly between the deductible and the insurance; in total it remains the same with and without insurance. In the extreme case, the insurance saves us a multiple of the premium. Often, however, the premium is higher than the insurance payout, because the losses naturally often stay below the deductible. From here, the insurance can be optimised further.
Taking the result into the risk aggregation
Suppose we take out the insurance and want to include the residual risk in the risk aggregation from Figure 1. To do this, we calibrate a distribution to the simulated self-retained losses and check which distribution fits best.
Figure 7 shows the result. On the left are the distributions, sorted by the Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic. The smaller it is, the better the distribution fits. At the very top are Flex with 0.0034 and Poly with 0.0082. The modified PERT distribution ModPert with 0.0144 is also selected. In the middle, the simulated data are shown as orange bars, with the three selected distributions on top.
Figure 7: Calibrating distributions to the simulated self-retained losses. Flex (blue) follows the peaks of the data, Poly (green) and ModPert (red) smooth them (German interface).
The Flex distribution is so adaptable that it reproduces the peaks of the uncovered secondary losses very precisely. If you are worried about overfitting here, you take a Poly distribution. It smooths the peaks and shows the essential shape of the losses. Other distributions such as the modified PERT distribution also fit well. It is very well suited to being calibrated to data.
More on this: Our article “Custom distributions in a Monte Carlo simulation: the Flex distribution” shows how to calibrate a Flex distribution to data.
We choose a suitable distribution, copy it and paste it into the risk aggregation. There we set the probability of occurrence of this risk to 1, because everything that happens is already summarised in this distribution. In this way, a risk assessed with a model is transferred into enterprise risk management in a few steps.
What changes with model-based assessment
In this new kind of risk assessment, expert judgement has changed its character. In the past, experts had to assess abstract risks for the company as a whole. Today they define which concrete factors influence a risk and how these interact. The factors are tangible and measurable. If developments are possible that are not contained in the data, you can, for example, adjust the attack frequency manually and override the data at that point. Assessing an individual factor is more tangible and much easier to discuss. This allows more control and feedback.
One important keyword is validation. In conventional approaches it is often missing entirely. Forecasts are made, but it is rarely checked how realistic they were and what actually happened. With model-based assessments, validation becomes easier because there are now many concrete, observable factors. For each factor, you can check whether it stayed within the range of the forecast. You no longer have to wait for a major incident. Risk management thus gains a much clearer view of its situation.
Who estimates the risks?
The second part of the talk shows what else needs to be considered when designing an entire risk management process. We concentrate on the aspects that matter for risk assessment.
In short: The Enterprise Risk Explorer is Wehrspohn’s software for enterprise risk management. We use it to show the second part. In the video it still carries its earlier name, “Enterprise Risk Evaluator”.
You can think of such a system as a production line that covers a long value chain. It starts with many people in different roles in the company working together. Risks are assessed, aggregated and analysed, and reports are produced. Urgent problems may lead to escalations. The results have to be validated, for example against recorded loss events, and the entire process is audited internally and externally. At the end, all reports and results are archived. Interestingly, many fundamental questions of risk assessment have less to do with mathematics and statistics. Rather, they lie in the design of this production line, that is, in the design of the risk management process.
When a risk is recorded, the header contains master data such as the risk ID, name and description. The risk is assigned to a group company, a risk classification and, where applicable, a business unit. These fields locate the risk in the group structure but are less relevant for quantification. The part that matters for the assessment begins with the people who have to work together and the tasks assigned to them.
In the example from the talk, there are four roles: a subject matter expert, an assessment expert, someone who approves the assessed risk and, where applicable, one or more observers. Such roles can be designed flexibly in the risk management process and filled with tasks.
The problem with the classic risk expert
The most important and most unusual roles in this example are the subject matter expert and the assessment expert. We have split the classic role of the risk expert into these two roles. The classic risk expert is often a challenge for enterprise risk management. Usually this person is a senior manager with little knowledge of risk management but a lot of experience in internal politics. The role of the risk expert often leads to a strong simplification of risk assessment. Sometimes this goes so far that distributions are no longer addressed at all, and only two or three fields remain for the best case, the worst case and the expected case. Of all things, these are values with major hidden problems.
The political level is another problem. A managing director will often find it difficult to assess his risks correctly. Often he does not even want to, because he would like to adjust the presentation of the risk to his advantage. This political level can lead to conflicts. For the risk management team, it is problematic to let those who cause the risks dictate how large the risks are. This damages the standing of risk management in the company. The process therefore needs a reorientation, which a risk management system has to support.
Subject matter expert and assessment expert
The person who used to be the risk expert can still make a valuable contribution, because they know the matter well and are responsible for it. They can state which factors are important and how they interact. In this role, they are the subject matter expert. The second part of the role is taken over by the assessment expert. The assessment expert listens to the subject matter expert’s assessment and builds a risk model from it. Different requirements apply to this role. Simplification is not the priority. Rather, the assessment expert needs a range of methods to represent the risk factors realistically.
Splitting the role of the risk expert is a necessary step for a company to achieve credible risk assessments. The subject matter expert and the assessment expert shape the risk assessment together and thus arrive at a well-founded result. The involvement of an assessment expert can be optional, for example only for material risks above a very high threshold. This is important because an organisation has to develop step by step over longer periods. It is not possible to assess all risks with models straight away.
Approval and observers
The role of the approver is not new. It ensures the four-eyes principle. An assessment is only approved once it has been reviewed by a person who was not involved in the assessment. In some companies, the managing director delegates the role of the risk expert to an assistant and then approves the assistant’s assessment as the approver. That is not a four-eyes principle. A valid review requires the approval to be given by an independent person who knows the assessment methods well and is recognised in the company.
The last role is that of the observers, who can follow the discussion about the risk. They can be members of the risk committee or of the management, a peer group of the subject matter expert or other relevant people who can also give feedback on this risk.
What is a risk score?
A risk comes with a great deal of qualitative and quantitative information. This includes cause-and-effect heuristics such as the bow-tie analysis, ideas for future measures, early warning indicators for the assessment and forecasts of the general and specific development of the risk. So that subject matter experts know what belongs in a field, a help text can be shown next to it.
Qualitative assessments are important too, because a risk can cause non-financial damage, such as compliance violations, reputational damage, personal injury or the loss of a licence. Categories such as small, medium and large for the probability of occurrence or the impact can be derived dynamically from the risk assessment. In this way, different statements about the same risk always remain consistent and free of contradictions.
With several types of impact, the assessment of a risk becomes multidimensional. A small financial loss can, for example, be combined with a serious compliance violation and international reputational damage. How high is the risk overall across all dimensions? This can be expressed by a risk score that combines all dimensions. The risk score is a calculated field. It can access all risk assessments, including model-based ones, and combines them in a formula that the user defines.
Figure 8 shows an example. The risk is rated “stark” (strong) for potential non-compliance and “Vertrauenskrise (international)” (international crisis of confidence) for reputational damage. Next to each field there is an explanation of the levels, for non-compliance, for example, from “Ohne” (none) to “Sehr Stark” (very strong). Below is the risk score with its formula and a short explanation.
Figure 8: Qualitative assessment of a risk with explanations of the levels and the formula for the risk score (German interface).
The formula of the risk score reads as follows, with the German field names for probability of occurrence, material damage, reputational damage and potential non-compliance:
= Eintritts-Wahrscheinlichkeit * (Materielle Schäden + (Rep. Schaden + Potenzielle Non-Compliance) * 0.5)
According to the explanation, the risk score combines financial, compliance and reputational damage and weights them with the probability of occurrence. A risk score like this quickly shows the company’s top risks. In the risk inventory, the assessments appear as symbols or categories, and next to them the risk score calculated from them as a number.
How do you assess risks gross, net and under stress?
The actual assessment of the losses from a risk is done with scenarios. They can first be set globally for the company, for example gross and net, that is, before and after measures. A target scenario is also possible, in which all planned measures are treated as implemented. Scenarios can also be specialised, for example a net scenario with effects on the company’s debt or liquidity. Stress scenarios are also helpful for seeing how a macroeconomic crisis affects the company.
Assessments can be mandatory or optional. If a risk does not respond to a particular stress scenario, no separate assessment is needed. A fallback scenario is then used, for example the net scenario.
Override scenarios in a group
In large companies, group companies may assess a risk differently from the parent company. The parent may be subject to different regulation or see intra-group dependencies that play no role for the subsidiary. In group risk management, override scenarios can be used in such cases. An override scenario is an alternative assessment that is placed next to the original one without deleting it. Both assessments are documented in an auditable way, and every simulation shows which scenario a risk was assessed with. This keeps the reassessment transparent and traceable.
Manual aggregation
The same applies to manual aggregation. Here a new risk is entered that replaces a list of other risks. For example, different regions each assess their risk in the Christmas business. Group risk management, however, knows that the Christmas business will go similarly for all of them. It can aggregate the risks under this assumption, for example in Risk Kit, and import the result. The individual risks are then no longer simulated separately but are contained in the manual aggregate, which enters the group aggregation.
How do you handle several years and the current financial year?
A scenario is assessed for at least as many years as risk management specifies. The years appear side by side, each with a preview chart of the impact. What you see is what you get: the inputs can be checked directly, and the years can be compared with each other.
Figure 9 shows the assessment of a risk before measures over five years with the PERT distribution. The amounts are in thousands of euros (TEUR). The probability of occurrence is 20% in every year, and the risk can occur only once per year. The best case is 350 TEUR in every year and the worst case 1,100 TEUR. The most likely case rises from 750 TEUR in the first year to 1,050 TEUR in the fifth. In the preview charts, the peak of the distribution therefore moves to the right from year to year.
Figure 9: Assessment of a risk before measures over five years with the PERT distribution, with a preview chart for each year (German interface).
The Enterprise Risk Explorer offers the same distributions as Risk Kit, and a risk assessed in Risk Kit can be taken over. In the talk, this is done with the cyber risk from the first part, this time using the gross result before measures. As in the first part, a distribution is calibrated to the simulated result. Again the Flex distribution fits best, because it adapts very well to the individual peaks that represent the secondary losses. You can simulate the distribution for one year and carry it over to the following years, or simulate several years directly. In a multi-year simulation, the dependencies between the periods can be preserved so that developments are represented correctly.
If a risk assessment updates itself from an external data source, the Excel model can be attached to the risk and evaluated by the system. Such a model covers one scenario and has to deliver values for every year. The same applies to assessing a risk with an R script. Regular simulations are particularly useful when material risks are assessed by such models. If the risks are mainly assessed by expert judgement, this is less necessary, because the results usually stay the same.
Preparing the aggregation
For the aggregation, we specify which risks are to be included and thus form a portfolio. Each group company can have its own portfolios. We specify the number of simulation runs and the number of years for which the forecast is made. As in the first part, the risk-bearing capacity is described as a risk tolerance curve. Risk capital is lost in different escalation levels, and limits are set for each level.
In addition, you can set up a profit and loss statement with planned figures that contains intermediate results and leads step by step to profit after tax. The risks are assigned to one or more items of the profit and loss statement with shares. From the items of the profit and loss statement and base figures such as equity, provisions and capital employed, key figures can be calculated, including by complex formulas as with the rating. In the talk, this is again the procedure by Marco Wolfrum and Werner Gleißner from the first part. For all key figures, risk-adjusted values, ranges and distributions are calculated.
If you want to check the simulations or document every step, you can export the intermediate results. You then see all results for each risk for every year and every simulation run and can analyse them further in Risk Kit. If you reset the seed of the random number generator before the simulation, the simulation can be reproduced exactly. This does not change the quality of the simulation, but if questions arise, intermediate results can be produced after the fact.
The current financial year
If the effects of the risks on the profit and loss statement are to be determined, the current financial year is often a special case. It is naturally incomplete if it began some time ago. You can therefore specify that the first year is adjusted to the remaining term of the financial year. The probabilities and frequencies of occurrence are then adjusted to this period.
How long does the risk capital last?
The more risks are assessed with models, the more important good risk aggregation and risk analysis become. Model-based assessments react more strongly to the economic and social environment, while expert judgements often remain surprisingly stable even in crises. This raises real questions for risk managers:
- How large is the company’s risk?
- Are we able to bear our risks?
- How does the risk-bearing capacity develop over time?
- Do we have sufficient provisions?
- In long crises, do we have enough time to react before the capital runs out?
- Are there hidden large risks in the portfolio?
- How much risk capital do the individual risks consume?
- Should those who cause risks bear more of their cost?
- Which risks still leave large residual risks after measures?
- Are we taking large risks in areas outside our core business?
- Through which companies does risk enter the group?
- How do the risks affect our rating?
- What does our risk-adjusted profit and loss statement look like?
The results of a simulation can be analysed individually or in comparison. This can be a comparison with the same portfolio from the last quarter, that is, a trend analysis, or a comparison between scenarios, for example gross versus net or net versus stress. First come the risk-bearing capacity and the overall view as a bird’s-eye perspective on the portfolio. Then follows the drill-down by risks, risk fields and group companies, down to the perspective of each individual company. Finally come the risk-adjusted profit and loss statement, the key figures and the rating.
The risk-bearing capacity is aggregated not only across the portfolio but also over time. Figure 10 shows the consumption of risk capital compared with the risk capital itself. The dashed line is the risk capital of 4,500 TEUR at the limit of the risk-bearing capacity. The orange curve shows how the gross risk grows over the years, the blue curve shows the same net. Consumption in the net scenario is considerably lower and slower.
Figure 10: Risk-bearing capacity over time. At the top, the risk aggregated over the years gross (orange) and net (blue) compared with the risk capital of 4,500 TEUR; at the bottom, the values for the first three years and three escalation levels (German interface).
Here the first year ends with the financial year. It runs from October 2022 to January 2023 and therefore covers only four months. Together, the five periods cover 52 months, that is, four and a third years. This is why the curves end shortly after the mark 4.
We can see how much money the measures save over each period and how much longer the risk capital lasts, that is, how much room for manoeuvre in time the company gains in a crisis. Gross, the risk exceeds the risk capital after about one and a half years, net only after almost four years. Conversely, a stress scenario shows how this room for manoeuvre is shortened.
The table below the chart shows the figures for each year. Portfolio 1 is the gross simulation here, portfolio 2 the net simulation. At the limit of the risk-bearing capacity, measured with the 99% VaR, the risk capital of 4,500 TEUR is utilised gross at 39.93% in the first year, 87.78% in the second and 137.96% in the third. Net, the figures are 21.84%, 37.46% and 57.71%.
Below are two further escalation levels with their own limits: the loss of the BB rating, measured with the 95% VaR and a risk capital of 3,500 TEUR, and the loss of the BBB rating, measured with the 90% VaR and a risk capital of 2,500 TEUR. Gross, the level for the BBB rating is already exceeded in the second year, where utilisation is 102.62%. Net, it is 32.95% in the same year.
If there is a guarantor’s liability under which the losses of each period are offset, the risk-bearing capacity is shown without aggregation over time. Each year then stands on its own. In addition, the results show the classic overall results: the distributions in comparison and the risk figures with the requested values at risk, both for the individual years and aggregated.
How do measures change the individual risks?
For the individual risks there are visualisations of the sensitivities and risk maps. The comparisons show how the risks have changed through measures or over time. Figure 11 shows such a risk map for the second year. The horizontal axis shows the expected loss, the vertical axis the conditional value at risk (CVaR), that is, the average loss in those cases in which the VaR is exceeded. Both axes are in TEUR. The risks gross are orange, net blue, and a line connects the two points of each risk.
Figure 11: Risk map for the second year with the expected loss and the CVaR of the individual risks gross (orange) and net (blue) (German interface).
This shows at a glance how strongly the measures shift a risk. For the attack on the server infrastructure, risk 1, the expected loss falls from 166 to 38 TEUR and the CVaR from 1,748 to 992 TEUR. For the lack of qualification, risk 7, the expected loss falls from 159 to 1 TEUR and the CVaR from 429 to 19 TEUR.
Box plots make the ranges of the risks comparable on a common scale. Opportunities are green and losses red. Each risk can also be shown individually with charts and key figures, and the aggregates for risk fields and group companies are structured in the same way. At the end come the profit and loss statement with its key figures and the effect of the risks on the rating.
All these simulation results are available for reports. The reports are archived with a reference to the data used and made available to stakeholders in the company, such as the management, the risk committee or the auditors.